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Abstract
This paper studies how changes in energy input costs for U.S. manufacturers affect the relative
welfare of manufacturing producers and consumers (i.e. incidence). In doing so, we develop a
partial equilibrium methodology to estimate the incidence of input taxes that can simultaneously
account for three determinants of incidence that are typically studied in isolation: incomplete
pass-through of input costs, differences in industry competitiveness, and factor substitution
amongst inputs used for production. We apply this methodology to a set of U.S. manufacturing
industries for which we observe plant-level unit prices and input choices. We find that about
70 percent of energy price-driven changes in input costs are passed through to consumers. We
combine industry-specific pass-through rates with estimates of industry competitiveness to show
that the share of welfare cost borne by consumers is 25-75 percent smaller (and the share borne
by producers is correspondingly larger) than models featuring complete pass-through and perfect
competition would suggest.
JEL: H22, H23, Q40, Q54

∗
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Introduction

Greenhouse gas emissions are classic environmental externalities that have not faced stringent
U.S. or global policy, even in the face of mounting evidence that the economic costs from climate
change could be severe. The recent Paris Agreement on Climate Change, for example, is only
the latest attempt at voluntary global coordination. Existing and proposed policies designed to
address future climate change implicitly or explicitly place a price on carbon dioxide emissions.
Pricing carbon emissions, by design, will make fossil-fuel based energy consumption more expensive.
This has led to the dual concern by policymakers that increased energy costs will not only make
industries that rely on these energy inputs less competitive but also make consumers of industry
products worse off due to higher prices. Political debates about the extent to which greenhouse
gas mitigation policies would hurt consumers or firms have made these policies difficult to enact,
despite widespread consensus among economists that a carbon tax would be efficient.1 Despite
these concerns, relatively little is known about how changes in energy input costs would impact the
prices that consumers and producers face, or, more generally, consumer and producer welfare.2
This paper uses administrative data from the Census Bureau’s Census of Manufactures to
estimate the degree to which energy price-driven changes in production costs impact consumers
relative to producers (i.e., incidence) for a select set of U.S. industries. In so doing, this paper
offers a partial equilibrium approach to analyzing the incidence of changes in input costs while
accounting simultaneously for three important issues that the existing public finance literature
considers in isolation or not at all: substitution among productive inputs, incomplete pass-through
of input costs, and various forms of imperfect competition. Formally, we generalize recent theories
of incidence to derive a sufficient statistic representation for the incidence of producer input taxes
that depends on two parameters that we estimate: a pass-through rate and a measure of industry
competitiveness. The goal of this paper is to use these statistics to characterize industry-level
changes in consumer relative to producer surplus associated with changes in energy input costs.
While we focus on analyzing energy prices, the methodology is flexible enough that it could be
applied to study the industry-level incidence of a wide array of input cost shocks, such as minimum
wage laws, tariff liberalization for imported intermediate goods, or changes in capital costs.
The paper has two main empirical findings. First, for the several manufacturing industries we
1

For example, the National Association of Manufacturers lamented that a U.S. cap-and-trade program for CO2
would have a “devastating impact to manufacturing” due in part to inability “to adjust the price of their goods and
services quickly enough to match potentially steep energy cost increases” (Streeter, 2009). Similarly, the Heritage
Foundation review of climate regulation argues, “Americans will be hit repeatedly with higher prices as businesses
pass higher costs onto consumers.” They go on to say, “If a company had to absorb the costs, high energy costs
would shrink profit margins” (Loris and Jolevski, 2014).
2
The lack of empirical evidence has often been noted in the literature. Bento (2013) comments, “More research
that carefully quantifies the effects of environmental policies on the prices of final goods is also needed. Existing
research typically assumes that firms will have the ability to fully pass along the costs of environmental policies in the
form of higher consumer prices. Under many circumstances, this assumption may not be applicable.” Similarly, Parry,
Sigman, Walls, and Williams (2006) highlight. “Empirical studies on the extent to which the costs of environmental
policies are passed forward into higher prices of consumer products would be extremely valuable; at present, empirical
analyses typically assume 100% pass-through . . . ”
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study, we estimate a pass-through rate of around 0.70; that is, on average a 1 dollar increase in
marginal costs due to higher energy prices translates into a 70 cent increase in unit output prices.
Pass-through is greatest in the one industry in our study that appears to be the least competitive,
cement. We show that relaxing assumptions pertaining to complete pass-through and perfect
competition leads consumers to bear 25-75 percent less of the welfare burden than conventional
methods assume.3
To help frame ideas, consider a simple example of a manufacturing plant that faces increases in
carbon taxes. Economists have long recognized that the incidence of a tax, defined in this paper
as its impact on the welfare of producers relative to consumers, is independent of who physically
writes the check to pay it (Jenkin, 1872). The same principle applies for shocks to production costs
(e.g., oil supply disruptions arising from political events in oil-producing countries, or fracking).
The reason is that changes in production costs due to taxes or other market forces lead to changes
in prices and quantities of both outputs and inputs. In this example, a carbon tax levied at the
level of a manufacturing plant only physically applies to the plant since the government directly
collects tax revenue from the plant. If the tax causes plants to increase prices, then the tax burden
will shift forward to consumers. If the tax causes plants to invest in energy efficient production
technologies, then producers will have to pay less in energy taxes, minimizing their burden. Thus,
pass-through and input substitution describe means by which the party which physically pays a
tax can either transmit the effects of that tax to others or avoid paying the tax altogether.
The paper proceeds in three steps. First, we formalize a partial equilibrium expression for the
incidence of changes in the costs of a specific input like energy. The partial equilibrium focus delivers empirical tractability while necessarily abstracting away from important general equilibrium
phenomenon associated with the production supply chain or vertical integration more generally.
The recent theory of incidence focuses primarily on the role of output taxes, highlighting how incidence may differ depending on industry competitiveness (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). We begin
by showing how the incidence of input price changes can differ from the incidence of output taxes
because, in response to a change in input prices, firms can substitute across different inputs.
The key parameter determining incidence is the degree to which marginal costs are passed
through to output prices. The paper’s second part focuses on six U.S. manufacturing industries for
which we observe both unit prices and input costs: boxes, bread, cement, concrete, gasoline refining,
and plywood.4 We compute plant-level marginal costs using methods originally proposed by Hall
3

Most existing work on the incidence of energy costs assumes that the industry supply curve is infinitely elastic
and that producers are perfectly competitive, or equivalently, they assume that pass through is complete and that
consumers bear the entire welfare burden. Ultimately all welfare changes affect households, either through ownership
of firms (producer incidence) or through expenditure patterns (consumer incidence). The question of who owns firms
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is well established that capital ownership is not evenly distributed
across the U.S. population, so welfare losses to manufacturing producers and consumers have different incidence.
4
The Census Bureau primarily collects quantity data for industries in which quantity data is readily interpretable,
such as those industries that produce homogeneous products. A few additional industries produce homogeneous
products and have Census-collected price/quantity data. However, much of the quantity data in these industries has
been imputed, and the remaining, non-imputed sample sizes preclude the estimation of costs. Outside of industries
that produce homogeneous products, plant-level output price data is less readily available at the plant-level, and
in cases where the data is available (e.g., BLS producer price data), it is often not possible to observe or estimate
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(1986) and further developed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). In practice, this amounts to
estimating time-varying, plant-level markups using production function estimates and backing out
marginal costs as the difference between the price and the markup.
The paper’s third part estimates how energy price-driven changes in marginal costs are passed
through to output prices.5 Marginal cost pass-through is a necessary ingredient for any analysis
of input cost incidence, yet has received relatively little attention in the empirical literature. We
focus on energy-price induced variation in marginal costs both to address possible endogeneity issues stemming from measurement error and to deliver a policy-relevant, local average treatment
effect for energy-price induced, marginal cost pass-through. We generate proxies for changes in
plant-level energy costs that we use to instrument our measure of plant-level marginal costs. Both
of these instruments interact the shares of different fuels used for energy with time-series variation
in the prices of these fuels (a “shift-share” approach related to Bartik (1991)). The first instrument
relies on the fact that electricity prices vary over time and space depending on the local fuels used
for generation in a region. Specifically, we calculate the share of a state’s electricity generated by
coal, petroleum, and natural gas, and we interact these (lagged) generation shares with national
time-series variation in the prices of these fuels. For example, when coal prices rise, industrial electricity prices disproportionately rise in areas where coal-fired power plants generate a large share of
electricity.6 The second instrument for plant-level marginal costs uses the fact that manufacturing
industries rely on a range of different energy inputs into the production process. Thus, industries
whose production process mainly uses coal will see energy costs increase more when coal prices
rise, and industries that rely more on natural gas will see energy costs increase more when the
price of natural gas rises. Specifically, we interact (lagged) industry fuel input shares with national
time-series variation in the prices of these fuels. Both instruments are strong predictors of changes
in marginal costs. Using shocks to energy costs as instruments for marginal cost delivers a local
average treatment effect for how energy price-induced changes in marginal cost are passed through
to product prices. The paper concludes by combining information on cost pass-through with information on industry competitiveness to characterize the economic costs of energy price increases
for consumers relative to producers, separately by industry.
The paper has two primary contributions. First, we develop and implement a partial equilibrium
methodology to analyze the incidence of changes in input costs while accounting simultaneously for
three important features that the existing empirical literature considers in isolation: (i) firms can
changes in input costs. Plant level linkages between the BLS producer price survey and plant-level production surveys
such as the Census of Manufacturers should be a priority for future research.
5
The theory and the empirical setting are designed to explore the incidence of changes in energy input costs
as a lens through which to understand the incidence of a carbon tax. Recent research suggests that incidence of
taxes can differ from incidences of market based prices changes due to differences in consumer salience (Li, Linn,
and Muehlegger, 2014) or due to various forms of tax evasion (Marion and Muehlegger, 2008; Kopczuk, Marion,
Muehlegger, and Slemrod, 2016a).
6
Coal prices likely affected electricity prices more in the 1972-1997 years we study than they do today. In the
years we study, essentially all states had regulated electricity markets in which electricity prices depended on the
average and not the marginal cost of generating electricity. By contrast, after the period we study (i.e., since the late
1990s), many states have operated deregulated electricity markets in which marginal units (which more often run on
gas than coal) rather than average costs determine prices.
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substitute away from paying the input tax by changing their input mix, (ii) the industry supply
curve may not be infinitely elastic and pass-through may be incomplete, and (iii) incidence depends
on the competitiveness of an industry. Second, we estimate the partial equilibrium incidence of
energy cost changes for several U.S. industries, while relaxing several strong assumptions of previous
work.
This paper builds on several literatures. Researchers in public finance have used pass-through to
understand partial equilibrium tax incidence for decades (see e.g., (Poterba, 1996)).7 Typically, this
work focuses on estimating pass-through of sales taxes or cost pass-through in industries for which
costs are largely determined by a single input.8 Researchers typically combine these pass-through
estimates with an assumption about market structure (e.g., perfect competition) to characterize
incidence. When industries use a single input and when the market is perfectly competitive,
input cost pass-through is a sufficient statistic for the incidence of input costs. However, when
firms can substitute across different inputs used for production and/or when the market is not
perfectly competitive, pass-through alone is no longer sufficient. For example, Miller, Osborne,
and Sheu (2015) analyze the pass-through of energy costs in a single manufacturing industry –
cement – though assume a single factor of production, which precludes factor substitution.9 One
motivation for this paper is that an essential feature of energy taxes, tariff reforms for intermediate
inputs, minimum wage laws, or other regulation of inputs is that firms can change their use of the
regulated input. This substantially changes the welfare burden, formulas for measuring incidence,
and methods required to estimate the relevant parameters. Another motivation for this paper
is that, conditional on a given pass-through rate, incidence varies with industry competitiveness
(Katz and Rosen, 1985; Weyl and Fabinger, 2013); many of the most concentrated industries in
the United States are also industries that produce large amounts of CO2 emissions (e.g., steel,
petroleum refining, electricity, cement).
There is a related literature which highlights that welfare and incidence of environmental and
energy policy may differ dramatically for imperfectly competitive industries (Buchanan, 1969; Barnett, 1980). The nascent empirical work in this area typically studies a single industry for which
researchers have both detailed data and/or have specific knowledge about industry costs, consumer
preferences, and market structure (e.g., cement or electricity). With detailed data and industryspecific insight, researchers can estimate both the supply and demand side the market and then
explore welfare and incidence through a variety of policy counterfactuals Ryan (2012); Fowlie,
7
An important literature in public finance does study the general equilibrium incidence of carbon taxes and
energy prices, typically by using general equilibrium models based on input-output matrices and detailed expenditure
data (e.g., (Grainger and Kolstad, 2010)). However, this literature typically assumes that industries are perfectly
competitive, pass-through is complete, and firms cannot adjust input demands in response to changes in input costs.
In this paper, we try to relax these assumptions in a partial equilibrium, empirical setting. A priority for future work
should be to relax these assumptions in quantitative, general equilibrium models.
8
See e.g., the pass-through of gasoline taxes into retail gasoline or diesel prices (Doyle and Samphantharak, 2008;
Marion and Muehlegger, 2011; Kopczuk, Marion, Muehlegger, and Slemrod, 2016b) or European Union Emissions
Trading System (ETS) allowance prices to electricity wholesale prices (Fabra and Reguant, 2014).
9
Miller, Osborne, and Sheu (2015) assume “there are no viable substitutes for fossil fuel in the production process”
(p. 1).
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Reguant, and Ryan (2016). However, the data requirements and modeling choices in these studies
are typically industry specific, and it is not clear how the methodologies and/or results generalize into other sectors. Our finding that cement is quite different from the other industries we
study (in both cost pass-through and competitiveness) underscores that these findings may be hard
to generalize to other industries. In contrast to this existing literature, we develop an empirical
methodology to estimate the incidence of input costs for any industry in which we observe price
data and input choices. The approach is flexible enough to allow for changes in energy prices that
lead to factor substitution in production, and the approach is general enough to calculate incidence
in the presence of incomplete pass-through and/or deviations from perfect competition.
This paper is also related to a set of work analyzing how energy prices differentially affect
firms and industries. The literature on industry impacts of carbon policies is based largely on
simulation modeling, although a number of statistical analyses also exist (e.g., Kahn and Mansur
(2012), Aldy and Pizer (2015), and Martin, de Preux, and Wagner (2014)). The simulation analyses
include both short-term partial equilibrium assessments as well as long-term computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models.10 Davis, Grim, Haltiwanger, and Streitwieser (2013) document patterns
in plant-level electricity input prices for U.S. manufacturing using some of the same data we use,
though their focus is on explaining what determines patterns of electricity input prices, rather than
assessing their consequences. Relative to existing empirical literature in this area, we examine
unexplored outcomes such as how energy prices affect plant-level marginal costs and output prices
for a select group of industries.
Lastly, this project relates to a substantial empirical literature on pass-through of costs other
than energy prices. This literature spans many fields and explores the pass-through of exchange
rates (Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2008; Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh, and Li, 2011; Campa and
Goldberg, 2005), sales taxes (Poterba, 1996; Marion and Muehlegger, 2011), healthcare capitation
payments (Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney, 2015; Duggan, Starc, and Vabson, 2014), and minimum
wage laws (Harasztosi and Lindner, 2015). Few papers observe and/or estimate marginal cost passthrough, with recent exceptions including a paper focused on Indian manufacturing (De Loecker,
Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik, Forthcoming) and another constructing marginal costs from
fuel data in the Spanish electricity market (Fabra and Reguant, 2014). To the best of our knowledge,
no literature estimates marginal cost pass-through in U.S. manufacturing, a parameter which is a
necessary ingredient for characterizing the incidence of any input tax levied on U.S. manufacturers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the role of energy in the output of
U.S. manufacturing products. Section 3 describes a general theory of incidence that motivates our
empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5 describes the econometric setting.
Section 6 presents results, and Section 7 concludes.
10

Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih (2008) review more than a dozen prior U.S. and European analyses using CGE models.
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2

Energy and U.S. Manufacturing

A brief background on energy use in U.S. manufacturing may clarify this paper’s analysis.11 Manufacturing accounts for a large share of energy demand. Industrial energy consumption (which
includes manufacturing along with agriculture, mining, and construction) accounts for about 30
percent of U.S. end-use energy consumption and also about 30 percent of end-use greenhouse gas
emissions (EIA, 2015; USEPA, 2015). Energy is a limited direct cost for manufacturing on average, at about two percent of revenues for the entire manufacturing sector, though energy costs are
much greater in some industries (Becker, Gray, and Marvakov, 2013). In alkali and chlorine manufacturing, cement, gasoline refining, lime manufacturing, and primary aluminum production, for
example, energy costs (including energy that is physically formed into the manufactured product,
or “feedstock”) exceed 20 percent of revenues.
Manufacturing generally uses two categories of energy – electricity and primary fuels. Electricity’s price per British thermal unit (BTU) is two to five times the mean price of other energy
sources (EIA, 2010), partly because much of the raw fuel used to produce electricity is lost as heat.
The main primary fuels used in manufacturing are oil, natural gas, and coal. About 75 percent of
BTUs used for fuel in manufacturing come from natural gas, about 20 percent from coal, and the
remainder from oil and assorted sources (EIA, 2010). Natural gas is increasingly common, partly
because hydraulic fracturing decreased the domestic price of natural gas beginning around 2008
(see e.g., Hausman and Kellogg (2015)), though even in 1990, natural gas provided 75 percent of
BTUs used for fuel.
Manufacturing plants use energy for four general tasks: boiler fuels (about 25 percent of BTUs),
process production (40 percent), other on-site purposes (10 percent), and feedstock (25 percent).
Boiler fuels mainly come from natural gas and coal and are used for combined heat-and power,
cogeneration, or related purposes. Process production includes heating or cooling parts of the
manufacturing product itself, driving manufacturing machines, or electro-chemical processes. Driving machines almost exclusively use electricity, but other process production tasks use a mix of
natural gas, oil, and coal. Other on-site uses of energy include plant lighting, heating, cooling,
ventilation, and on-site transportation. Industries differ in their use of fuels based on the prevailing
production processes and regional availability of fuel inputs.
Energy is costly to store. Batteries are expensive enough that mass storage of electricity is
economically infeasible, and most electricity is consumed at the instant it is generated. Most
manufacturing plants obtain natural gas from distribution pipelines and do not store it on-site. Oil
and coal can be stored, though their weight and bulk mean they are stored in limited quantities. In
addition, industries differ in their use of different fuels based on the prevailing production processes
and regional availability of fuel inputs.
Different energy sources also have different spatial market structures. Electricity prices vary
both over time and space depending on the fuel mix, efficiency, and scheduling of electricity gen11

Except where otherwise noted, this section describes data for 2010, the year of the most recent Manufacturing
Energy Consumption Survey.
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erating units. In the years we study (pre-1998), which precede deregulation, an electric utility had
a monopoly over customers in its service territory, so the electricity prices an industrial customer
faced depended heavily on the fuels used by the electric utility serving it. Utilities supply most
electricity used in manufacturing, though additional electricity comes from non-utility generators
(e.g., merchant plants) and from on-site generation.12 Crude oil is traded on a global market. Manufacturing plants generally buy distillate or residual fuel oil, which is processed by refineries. Lack
of spatial integration in refinery markets introduces additional spatial variation in prices of these
petroleum products that is mostly driven by idiosyncratic changes in local supply and demand.13
Natural gas is transported by pipeline within the U.S. from producing to consuming regions. In the
years we study, much natural gas was extracted in Texas and Louisiana, and natural gas prices increase with distance from those areas due to pipeline transportation costs. The price at the location
where an interstate pipeline reaches a population center differs from the price that industrial plants
pay for natural gas due to local distribution costs and to distributor markups. Coal is more costly
than other fuels to transport, so coal prices vary more over space due to local market conditions.
This discussion should make clear that energy prices vary substantially, and they are an important input into the production process of many manufactured goods. The goal of this paper is to
better understand how this temporal and spatial variation in energy prices affect both manufacturing producers and their consumers. The next section formalizes these relationships by describing a
general theory of incidence of changes to input costs for production.

3

Theory of Incidence

There exists a body of research at the intersection of public finance and industrial organization
which describes how incidence might vary with industry competitiveness (Katz and Rosen, 1985;
Stern, 1987; Weyl and Fabinger, 2013). We believe this literature is useful because some of the
most energy intensive manufacturing industries, are also industries characterized by very large fixed
costs and/or transportation costs which may lead to varying degrees of market power. (e.g., cement
and oil refining). The existing literature is primarily concerned with the incidence of output taxes,
and we extend this literature to analyze changes in input taxes (or input costs).14 The difference
is that firms must pay an output tax on every dollar of revenue but must only pay an input tax on
each unit of the input purchased. Firms can substitute away from the taxed input.
We first describe incidence assuming firms are either perfectly competitive or have a monopoly.
These polar cases illustrate the basic intuition for how incidence differs with market power. We
then describe a more general setting where firms within an industry are characterized by arbitrary
forms of competition.
12

Our empirical analysis counts on-site electricity generation as primary fuel consumption since in this case the
data record the plant buying fuels rather than the plant buying electricity.
13
Our analysis refrains from using local price variation in petroleum products to avoid confounding variation in
energy prices with variation in local economic conditions.
14
We abstract from the use of potential tax revenue.
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A few assumptions guide the analysis. The following discussion and subsequent analysis is
partial equilibrium. We consider taxes on variable input costs, not fixed costs. We make the
assumption, consistent with most of the literature, that all goods outside the focal industry (including markets for the taxed input) are supplied perfectly competitively, and thus that the welfare
of producers arising from consumer substitution to these goods may be ignored.15 Additionally, we
assume the taxed input has perfectly elastic supply.16
Finally, some of our results assume that average variable costs equal marginal costs: AV C =
M C. While average variable costs are the variable of immediate relevance in the theory, marginal
costs are more suitable for empirical analysis, and this assumption ensures they are equivalent.
Some production technologies are sufficient to ensure this assumption; examples include constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions or technologies with constant marginal costs
(e.g., Melitz (2003)). For others like Cobb-Douglas or the translog function that we use, constant
returns to scale implies that AV C = M C.
We begin with key definitions. Let I denote the incidence of a marginal increase in the tax rate
τ , defined as the ratio of its effects on consumer and producer surplus (CS and PS):
I≡

dCS/dτ
dP S/dτ

Incidence above one implies that consumers bear a majority of the welfare loss, while incidence
below one implies that producers do. Let ρ denote the pass-through rate of a tax, defined as the
marginal change in the level of output prices P due to a change in input tax rates:
ρ≡

dP
dτ

Let γ denote the cost-shift rate, defined as the marginal effect of the input tax rate τ on marginal
costs: γ ≡ dM C/dτ . The cost-shift rate γ can be less than or greater than one. Finally, let
dAV C/dτ denote the change in average variable costs (equal to variable costs divided by total
output) due to a marginal increase in the tax rate.
Given these definitions, we now turn to describe the key incidence results.17 Perfect competition
provides a useful baseline since its results are simple and intuitive. In perfectly competitive markets
with input taxation, the pass-through rate and the cost shift rate fully characterize tax incidence.
The incidence simply equals the pass-through rate divided by the cost shift rate minus the pass15

In principle, relaxing this assumption is possible but would require estimates of cross-price elasticities across
industries, which are difficult to estimate. Future work could combine the insights from Goulder and Williams III
(2003) to derive empirically implementable formulas for incidence in the presence of pre-existing distortions in other
markets.
16
Inelastically supplied or imperfectly competitive inputs could be analyzed with similar tools as used here.
17
We describe the incidence of infinitesimal changes in tax rates. Characterizing the incidence of discrete changes
in tax rates requires integrating over changes in consumer and producer surplus from the initial tax rate to the new
tax rate. The incidence of a discrete change in tax rates then depends on the average pass-through rate between the
baseline and new tax rate, where the average is weighted by the quantities consumed at each tax rate (Weyl and
Fabinger, 2013).
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through rate:
I Competitive

ρ
dAV C/dτ − ρ
ρ
=
γ−ρ
=

The second equality follows under the assumption AV C = M C.
This result has an intuitive basis that stems directly from an application of the envelope theorem
to the consumer and producer side of the market. A marginal increase in a tax decreases consumer
surplus by the equilibrium quantity consumed, Q∗ , times the change in consumer prices, ρ. A
marginal increase in a tax decreases producer surplus by Q∗ times the change in producer prices
relative to average variable costs, dAV C/dτ − ρ. Thus, the incidence of a tax in a competitive
market equals the ratio of these two terms, ρ/(dAV C/dτ − ρ). Describing the incidence of a tax in
a perfectly competitive market only requires knowing the pass-through rate and the effect of tax
on average variable costs (if M C = AV C, the latter is replaced with the cost-shift rate), making
pass-through and cost-shifting parameters “sufficient statistics” for incidence of changes in input
costs.
Figure 1 illustrates incidence under perfect competition Panel A shows a shift in average variable costs, dAV C/dτ , due to an input tax, and Panel B shows the levels of consumer and producer
surpluses in the new equilibrium. As visualized, a small change in average variable costs causes
consumer surplus to decrease by the change in prices, ρ, times the output quantity Q∗ . Producers
now receive an additional ρ per unit sold, however this is offset by the change in additional production costs, ∆AV C. An output tax simplifies this analysis, as dAV C/dτ = γ = 1, reflecting how an
output tax cannot be avoided through input factor substitution.
Similar results are available for an input tax faced by a monopolist – the incidence of a tax
on an input for a monopolist is simply I M onopoly = ρ/(dAV C/dτ ) = ρ/γ.18 Again the second
equality follows by the assumption AV C = M C. For any standard pass-through rate (greater
than zero), consumers bear a greater share of the burden under perfect competition than under
monopoly. Figure 2 illustrates incidence under monopoly with increasing marginal costs. The
change in consumer surplus is identical to the perfect competition case, and equals the change in
price ρ times quantity Q∗ . However, the change in producer surplus is entirely determined by the
change in average variable costs ∆AV C, as the change in prices is offset by the additional change
in quantity.
We now turn to a more general form of competition that nests both perfect competition and
monopoly. We start by assuming all firms in the market are identical, but we later relax this
assumption. Let D ≡ −[dQ/dP ][P/Q] denote the elasticity of demand. This elasticity describes
price shocks and quantity decisions for an individual firm. Let L ≡ (P − M C)/P denote the Lerner
18
The consumer side of the market is calculated in the same way as with perfect competition. The producer side of
the market is derived by differentiating producer surplus with respect to the tax rate, then aggregating across firms
(Weyl and Fabinger, 2013).
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(1934) index, a measure of markups, which equals the gap between price and marginal cost, divided
by price. In the presence arbitrary forms of competition, the incidence of an input tax depends on
four statistics: the pass-through rate ρ, the cost-shift rate γ, the Lerner index L, and the demand
elasticity D . Note that perfect competition is a special case where LD = 0, and monopoly is a
special case where LD = 1.
Proposition 1 Under generalized oligopoly, with N symmetrical firms and AVC=MC, incidence
takes the form:
I=

ρ
γ − (1 − LD )ρ

(1)

Proof. Each of the N symmetric producers maximizes profits selling Qi units at price P:
π = (P − M C) Qi
Differentiating profits with respect to an input tax τ and substituting in definitions of L, D , ρ,
and γ produces the following relationship:
dπ
= Qi [(1 − LD ) ρ − γ] .
dτ
Consumer surplus is simply given by dCS/dτ = −Qρ. Aggregating across all producer, incidence
can then be written as:
I=

−Qρ
dCS/dτ
=
,
dP S/dτ
N · Qi [(1 − LD ) ρ − γ]

where Q = N · Qi is the total quantity produced by all N symmetrical producers. This term
simplifies to equation (1).
Equation (1) also has an intuitive explanation. The loss to consumers equals the change in
product price, ρ. The loss to producers equals the change in marginal costs, γ, minus the change
in product price, ρ. The firm’s change in product prices depends on the term 1 − LD .
These equations help contrast input and output taxes. For all three cases — perfect competition,
monopoly, and general oligopoly — the incidence of input taxes differs from the incidence of output
taxes. For an output tax, γ = 1 since firms cannot substitute away from the tax on a given product.
For an input tax, the most likely scenario is γ < 1, i.e., marginal costs increase less than 1 for 1
with a tax on a single input. This is because firms can substitute away from a taxed input. Thus,
conditional on the pass-through rate, input taxes are likely to put a greater share of the burden
on consumers (and a smaller share on firms) than output taxes do. Relative to output taxes,
input taxes allow firms to substitute away some of the potential increase in marginal cost, thereby
lessening the cost to profits.
When taking equation (1) to the data, we use a slightly simpler though analytically equivalent
version. Recall that ρ is the pass-through of the tax rate to product prices. Let ρM C denote the
pass-through of marginal costs to product prices, so ρM C ≡ dP/dM C. Dividing the numerator and
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denominator of (1) through by γ and using ρ = γρM C gives
I=

ρM C
1 − (1 − LD )ρM C

(2)

This second version requires estimating only three parameters: marginal cost pass-through ρM C ,
the Lerner index L, and the demand elasticity D .19 In taking equation (2) to the data, we also
report a measure of incidence which is slightly easier to interpret: the change in consumer surplus
as a share of the total change in consumer and producer surplus, or I/(1 + I).
These expressions show that pass-through is a key ingredient in the calculation of incidence,
but it is also useful to clarify what determines pass-through. In perfectly competitive markets,
pass-through is a simple function of demand and supply elasticities D and S :
ρCompetitive =

1
1 + (D /S )

This leads to the standard rule-of-thumb that the side of the market (producer or consumer) which
is relatively more inelastic bears more of the tax burden. Under imperfect competition, passthrough depends not only on demand and supply elasticities but also the curvature of demand and
market power.20,21

4

Data

The primary data for our analysis comes from administrative survey records collected by the U.S.
Census Bureau. We supplement this data with information from the Energy Information Agency
(EIA) on energy prices, consumption, and generation.

Census of Manufacturers (CM)
We use administrative data on annual plant-level inputs and outputs from the Census Bureau’s
Census of Manufacturers (CM). We use this data to measure plant level inputs, such as capital,
labor, and materials.22 The CM is conducted quinquennially in years ending with a 2 or 7, and
19

We estimate marginal cost pass-through for two reasons. First, for this homogeneous firms case, it avoids the
need to estimate the cost-shift parameter γ. Second, we lack data on plant-level energy input prices.
20
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that pass-through under symmetric imperfect competition may be written as

−1
LD
D − LD
LD
1+
+
+
θ
S
ms
Pass-through depends on demand and supply elasticities D and S , the elasticity of inverse marginal surplus ms ≡
M S/M S 0 Q, where M S is the marginal consumer surplus M S ≡ −P 0 Q, and θ ≡ θ/[q(dθ/dq)], and where θ ≡ LD .
21
Weyl and Fabinger (2013) describe alternative formulas that apply for asymmetric firms. While such results
can also be derived for input taxes, our small sample precludes us from estimating separate pass-through rates for
each firm or separate demand elasticities for each firm (instead calculating average pass-through rates and average,
firm-specific demand elasticities), so we leave study of this area for future work.
22
Labor inputs are measured as plants’ reported production-worker hours adjusted using the method of Baily,
Hulten, and Campbell (1992) (i.e., multiplying production-worker hours by the ratio of total payroll to payroll for
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we draw upon CM years from 1972 through 1997. These sample years are chosen based upon the
availability and quality of physical output data in the CM.23 We measure labor inputs in hours,
capital as plants’ reported book values of equipment and structures, and materials and energy inputs
as the reported expenditures on each. We deflate capital, material, and energy expenditures using
the corresponding industry-specific input price indices from the NBER Productivity Database.
CM unit prices, which we calculate as product-level revenue divided by quantity, involve several
challenges. Since output prices can reflect unobserved product quality, we follow Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008, hereafter FHS) in limiting analysis to single-product plants in six
industries that produce homogenous products: Boxes, Bread, Cement, Concrete, Gasoline, and
Plywood.24,25 A minority of firms within these industries have multiple products. For the plants
that satisfy these criteria but still produce other products, we follow FHS and scale the focal product output by the inverse of the revenue share. This input-adjustment method assumes inputs are
used proportionately to each product’s revenue share. Another challenge is widespread imputation.
We exclude any observation identified as an “administrative record” since many of their values are
imputed, and we also exclude records where any input or output is imputed.26
Since a few observations still appear to be errors, we make additional sample restrictions similar
to those of Roberts and Supina (1996, 2000) and FHS. We exclude a small number of plants
reporting physical quantities that imply prices greater than ten times or less than one-tenth the
median price in a given industry-year. We also exclude observations missing any one of the main
production function variables (i.e., labor, capital, materials, or output quantity). Additionally, we
exclude observations where the plant’s labor or materials cost share is less than one-tenth of the
corresponding industry’s average cost share for that year or when the cost share is more than one.
Finally, we trim the one-percent tails of a productivity index measure.27 All unit output prices are
adjusted to a common 1987 basis using the revenue-weighted geometric mean of the product price
in a given year across all of the plants producing the product in our sample.
production workers).
23
In more recent years, the amount of quantity data collected in the CM has declined considerably, making analyses
of more recent time periods infeasible for most, if not all, industries.
24
Following FHS, we define a plant as single product if it receives over half its revenue from the homogeneous
product of interest. This definition uses revenue and not quantity shares since different products are measured in
different units. When selecting single-product plants, we ignore revenues from product codes for contract work,
miscellaneous receipts, product resales, and balancing codes. The Census Bureau creates balancing codes when
the summed value of shipments for reported individual products does not equal the plant’s reported total value of
shipments.
25
This adds cement to the FHS industries but excludes several of FHS’ industries (sugar, carbon black, coffee,
flooring, block and processed ice), for two reasons. Unlike FHS, we exclude observations with imputed quantity, which
substantially reduces sample sizes. Also unlike FHS, we estimate industry-specific coefficients in translog production
functions. To have sufficient sample size, we exclude industries which, after imposing our sample restrictions, have
less than 100 plant-year observations.
26
We thank Kirk White for providing the product-level imputation data for the first half of our sample. Many,
if not all, researchers using the census microdata for empirical research in economics drop imputed values such as
administrative records (see e.g., Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997); Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008); Linn
(2008); Atalay, Hortaçsu, and Syverson (2014)).
27
The productivity index is constructed using a gross-output, Cobb-Douglas production function with labor, capital,
and materials as inputs. The output elasticities are computed using industry-level cost shares under the assumption
of constant returns to scale, and output is measured using physical quantities.
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It is worth commenting a bit further on the six industries that remain the focus of this paper.
Some of these industries are particularly important consumers of energy in U.S. manufacturing. A
fourth of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions come from transportation, and most fuels for the transportation sector pass through oil refineries. Cement is one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas
emissions in the world. We have chosen these industries because they have price/quantity data
and are relatively homogenous, though the relative homogeneity of their products limits product
differentiation as a source of market power.

Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS) and Annual Survey of
Manufacturers Fuels Trailer
We supplement the CM with plant-level data on fuels from the Manufacturing Energy Consumption
Survey (MECS), which was collected about every 3 years beginning in 1981, and from the Annual
Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) Fuels Trailer, which accompanied the ASM annually between 1973
and 1979, excluding 1977. These surveys report physical fuel consumption separately for each fuel.
Energy expenditures in these data exclude feedstocks used for production. Since gasoline refining
spends a significant fraction of material costs on energy feedstocks, we augment the energy cost
shares for gasoline refining to include the costs of energy feedstocks, which we get from the ASM
and CM materials input trailers.

Energy Information Association - State Energy Data System (SEDS)
We use data from the EIA’s State Energy Data System (SEDS) to measure the annual national
and state fuel prices for coal, oil, and natural gas. We also use these data to measure the share
of electricity generation in a state generated with each of these fuels. The EIA compiles SEDS
primarily from surveys of energy suppliers. We convert all fuel prices to real 1987 dollars using
the average of the industry-specific energy price deflators for the industries in our sample from the
NBER Productivity Database.

5

Econometrics of Pass-Through

We now turn to describe our methodology in six steps. The goal of the first five steps is to estimate
the pass-through rate of marginal costs into output prices. First, we describe how we recover
marginal costs from production data. Second, we describe how we use production functions to
recover output elasticities, which are needed to calculate marginal costs. Third, we describe the
two research designs for energy prices. Fourth, we describe the analysis of how energy prices affect
marginal costs and unit prices. Fifth, we describe how we estimate pass-through. Finally, we
describe how we estimate demand elasticities.
Before proceeding, we note a general point about our methodology. One alternative way to
estimate pass-through would be to estimate how a plant’s output price changes with respect to a
plant’s input price for energy. Our application does not use this approach for two reasons. First,
13

the incidence of input cost shocks typically requires estimates of both the pass-through rate and
the cost-shift parameter (γ), but marginal cost pass-through is a sufficient statistic for both input
cost pass through and the cost-shift rate. Second, we do not observe plant-level energy prices.28

5.1

Recovering Marginal Costs

We recover marginal costs by combining plant-level production data with assumptions on firm
cost minimization. As originally shown by Hall (1986) and further developed by De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012), a firm’s first-order condition implies that the plant’s multiplicative markup (i.e.,
its price divided by its marginal cost) equals the output elasticity of a variable input like energy or
materials divided by the revenue share of that input.29 Thus, if we can identify an output elasticity
of a variable input, we can recover a markup. Moreover, if we have price data, we can back out
marginal costs as price divided by the markup.
Formally, let Qit denote the physical output Q of plant i in year t. Output is a function of
variable inputs Vit (i.e., those not subject to adjustment costs) like materials and energy; dynamic
inputs Kit like capital or sticky labor, which are subject to adjustment costs; and plant-specific
productivity Ωit : Qit = Qit (Vit , Kit , Ωit ). We assume a firm minimizes the cost of the variable
input(s), conditioning on the dynamic inputs. The firm solves the following Lagrangian:
L(Vit , Kit , λit ) = PitV Vit + Rit Kit + λit [Qit − Qit (Vit , Kit , Ωit )]
Here PitV is the price of variable inputs, Rit is the price of dynamic inputs, and λit is the Lagrange
multiplier.
The firm’s first-order condition for a variable input like materials is
∂L
∂Qit (·)
= PitV − λit
∂Vit
∂Vit
Rearranging terms for an optimum where ∂L/∂Vit = 0 and multiplying the right-hand side by
Vit Qit /Vit Qit and both sides by Pit shows how we recover markups:

 V
−1
Pit
∂Qit (·) Vit
Pit Vit
=
λit
∂Vit Qit Pit Qit

(3)

The left-hand side of this equation is the multiplicative markup µit , which equals prices divided
the Lagrange multiplier. The Lagrange multiplier represents marginal costs, since it reflects the
28
The closest information is the “cost of fuels,” which represents total expenditure on all fuels, but does not
distinguish each fuel or identify price or quantity. The Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey does report these
variables for a small sample of plants and is not longitudinal. The Census of Manufacturers does report plant-level
unit prices for a single energy input — electricity. Using variation in these prices is subject to concerns about bulk
discounts (Davis, Grim, Haltiwanger, and Streitwieser, 2013) and endogeneity.
29
The output elasticity is defined as the change in a plant’s physical output due to a change in a variable input like
materials; the revenue share of a variable input like materials is defined as the plant’s expenditure on that variable
input divided by the plant’s total revenue. An intuition for why this approach identifies markups is that in an
imperfectly competitive market, input growth must be associated with disproportionate revenue growth.
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costs of relaxing the output constraint. The right-hand side is the product of two bracketed terms;
we construct empirical analogues to both. The first is the elasticity of output with respect to
a variable input, or the “output elasticity.” We estimate the output elasticity from production
functions, described in the next subsection. The second bracketed term is the cost of the variable
input divided by the firm’s revenue, or the “revenue share.” Our data report the revenue share of
each input.
We can then compute a time-varying, plant-level markup by using the estimated output elasticity of a variable input and the revenue share of that input. Since we observe plant-level unit
prices, we then recover marginal costs from the accounting identity that price equals markups times
marginal costs: M Cit = Pit /µit where M Cit is the marginal cost of plant i in year t, and µit is the
(multiplicative) markup.

5.2

Output Elasticities and Production Functions

The previous subsection showed that estimating markups requires the output elasticity of a variable plant-level input like materials. We estimate this output elasticity by using proxy methods
to estimate production functions (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg,
Caves, and Frazer, 2015). We focus on production functions with a scalar, Hicks-neutral productivity term and estimate elasticities separately by industry, assuming common technology across
firms and over time within an industry.30 We show a Cobb-Douglas specification here to simplify
exposition, though our results use a more flexible translog, gross-output production function:31
yit = βk kit + βl lit + βm mit + ωit + it

(4)

Throughout the paper, lowercase represents variables in logs. Here yit represents a plant’s output
quantity. We use output quantity rather than revenues here to avoid well-known bias in revenuebased productivity estimates.32 Firms use three inputs: capital, labor, and materials (kit , lit , and
mit ). Materials includes energy inputs in addition to other intermediate inputs used for production.
The parameter vector which we estimate, β ≡ (βk , βl , βm ), contains the output elasticities of these
three inputs. The term ωit represents productivity, which is known to the firm when making static
30

Output elasticities could in principle differ by industry and time period. Such flexible output elasticities are
difficult to estimate with our data, however, since we have few years of data, require one lag to construct instruments,
and have few observations for most industries.
31
Translog coefficients are the same across firms within an industry. Markups and output elasticities, however,
differ across firms within an industry, because input demands differ across firms. This is an advantage of translog
over Cobb-Douglas production functions, which would have the same output elasticity across firms within an industry.
Under Cobb-Douglas, all variation in markups across firms within an industry would come from revenue shares.
32
Output quantity addresses the distinction between revenue and physical total factor productivity (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008). Unobserved variation in input prices may also bias production function coefficients (De
Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik, Forthcoming). The homogeneity of our products potentially gives less
scope for input price variation and associated bias (De Loecker and Goldberg, 2014). We have explored specifications
that attempt to control for any remaining input price variation using a polynomial in the output price, and results
are largely similar. Our dataset reports expenditures on inputs though not input quantities; we are unaware of any
production function estimates in any setting using input quantity data for all inputs rather than price-deflated input
expenditures.
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input decisions but unobserved to the econometrician. The residual it includes measurement error
and unanticipated shocks to output.
Ordinary least squares estimates of equation (4) may suffer from omitted variables bias due
to the unobserved productivity term ωit (Marschak and Andrews, 1944). A firm observes its
productivity, so input choices kit , lit , and mit may depend on it, but productivity directly affects
output, and data do not report it.
To address the possible omitted variable bias associated with OLS estimates of equation (4),
we use control-function or proxy methods to control for the unobserved and omitted productivity
term. Consider a general demand function for materials:33 mit = mt (kit , lit , ωit ). Assuming that
mt (·) is strictly monotonic in inputs, we invert this input demand equation to solve for productivity
as a function of the observable inputs:
ωit = m−1
t (mit , kit , lit )
This inversion provides a control function for productivity.34
We apply this approach in two steps, following Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015). The first
step regresses plant output yit on a function φt (·) of observed inputs. This first step is designed to
purge output data of measurement error and unanticipated shocks to output it :
yit = φt (kit , lit , mit ) + it
We approximate φt (·) using a polynomial expansion. We use estimates from this first step to
calculate it from
ˆit = yit − φ̂t (kit , lit , mit )

(5)

where φ̂ contains the fitted values from this first step, and ˆit are the residuals from this regression.
Since it contains measurement error and unanticipated shocks to production, we can use it to obtain
a measure of output which is purged of both. After this first step, the only missing information
33
We focus on materials as a variable input into the production function, where materials include both purchased
intermediates as well as energy input expenditures. In theory, we could estimate a separate output elasticity for
energy in the production function. In practice, adding a fourth input into a translog production function substantially
increases the number of parameters to be estimated. With relatively small sample sizes and relatively few degrees of
freedom, output elasticities become more sensitive and less robust. Moreover, many indirect energy input costs are
embodied in material expenditures through feedstock purchases for example.
34
Inverting materials demand to recover productivity requires a one-to-one mapping between plant-level productivity and materials. This assumption fails if unobserved plant-level variables besides productivity drive changes
in materials or if there is measurement error in materials. Alternative production function estimators, such as the
dynamic panel methods developed by Blundell and Bond (2000) are not appropriate in our setting since we have
few time periods to construct differences and lags. Some evidence suggests these may not be first-order concerns.
Syverson (2004) finds robustness among producer TFP measures (and hence output elasticities) for one of our industries, ready-mixed concrete, with a specification incorporating idiosyncratic demand shocks. Van Biesebroeck (2007)
also finds high TFP correlations across various measurement alternatives. Given the strong assumptions needed to
estimate output elasticities, however, subsequent sections explore alternative methods to characterize incidence in
the absence of information on output elasticities and/or markups and marginal costs.
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needed to know the output elasticity vector β is the productivity vector ωit . Given any candidate
elasticity vector β̃, we can estimate productivity by manipulating equations (4) and (5) to get
ωit (β̃) = φbit − β̃k kit − β̃l lit − β̃m mit

(6)

The second step selects the coefficient vector that best fits the data by relying on the law of motion for productivity. We follow Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) and assume that productivity
follows a first-order Markov process.35 We define productivity shocks ξit as the difference between
productivity and the expectation of last period’s productivity given last period’s information set
Iit−1 :
ξit = ωit − E[ωit |Iit−1 ]
where E is the expectation operator. Equivalently, ξit represents the component of current productivity which was unexpected at time t − 1.
The second step estimates the production function coefficients using the assumption that this
productivity innovation must be orthogonal to a set of current and lagged input demands dit . We
summarize these conditions as
E[ξit (β)dit ] = 0

(7)

With the translog production function we use for the empirical implementation, the vector dit is
2
2
dit = {lit , mit−1 , kit , lit
, m2it−1 , kit
, lit mit−1 , lit kit , mit−1 kit }

These moments above are similar to those suggested by Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015).
They exploit the fact that capital and labor have adjustment costs, and lagged capital and labor
should not be correlated with the current productivity innovation. We use lagged rather than
current materials to identify the materials coefficients since current material expenditures may
react to contemporaneous productivity innovations. For lagged materials to be a valid instrument
for current materials, input prices must to be correlated over time.
Finally, we use generalized method of moments to choose the production function coefficients
β which minimize the moment conditions in equation (7). With translog production functions, the
coefficients β combined with input data give the output elasticities θ̂:36
θ̂it = θ(β̂, lit , mit , kit )
These output elasticities vary by plant and by year. This leads to plant-year variation in markups
35

We use the AR(1) process to derive a plausibly exogenous productivity shock ξit along the lines of Ackerberg,
Caves, and Frazer (2015). We have also allowed for the potential of additional lagged decision variables to affect
current productivity outcomes (in expectation) in order to accommodate the concerns raised by De Loecker (2011)
pertaining to the exogeneity of productivity process. For example, we have allowed productivity to depend on export
status and the nonrandom exit of firms (De Loecker, 2011; Olley and Pakes, 1996). In practice, our output elasticity
estimates are not particularly sensitive to these modifications.
36
The estimated output elasticity for materials, for example, is θ̂it = β̂m + 2β̂mm mit + β̂lm lit + β̂km kit + β̂lmk lit kit .
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(i.e., different markups for each plant within an industry-year) that is driven by both changes in the
plant-level revenue share for the variable input (e.g. materials) and changes in the mix of inputs
used for production.

5.3

Two Instrumental Variables for Marginal Costs

The previous two subsections show how we estimate output elasticities and marginal costs. These
two objects are theoretically sufficient to identify pass-through from a regression of unit prices on
marginal costs. However, marginal costs may be measured with error. To address the possible
endogeneity of marginal costs, we construct two sets of instrumental variables using variation in
energy input prices. Existing research uses other types of instrumental variables for marginal
costs, such as exchange rate shocks for imported intermediate inputs (e.g., De Loecker, Goldberg,
Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (Forthcoming)), though not in the context of U.S. manufacturing.
Our two measures of variation in local energy prices leverage the fact that national changes in the
price of a fuel disproportionately affect regions and industries heavily dependent on that fuel. For
example, when the national price of natural gas rises more than the national price of oil or coal,
energy prices in regions and industries heavily dependent on natural gas will disproportionately
increase. These “shift-share” designs are related to the Bartik (1991) instrument which is widely
used in labor and public economics to study exogenous movements in labor demand (see e.g.,
Blanchard and Katz (1992); Moretti (2011); Notowidigdo (2011)).
We first focus on variation in industrial electricity prices that are driven by regional differences
in electricity generation by fuel type. Figure 3 depicts the share of total state-level electricity
generation that comes from coal, natural gas, and petroleum/oil, respectively. The maps make
clear that the primary fuels used for electricity generation vary considerably over space. Coal
accounts for more than three-fourths of fuel for electricity generation in the Upper Midwest but
practically no electricity generation in the Western coastal states. Natural gas accounts for 15
percent of generation in the South but over 40 percent of generation in California. We interact this
cross-sectional variation in energy input shares (i.e., the shares of fuel costs devoted to electricity
generation in a state) with national trends in fuel prices to generate predicted changes in regional
electricity prices. Figure 4 shows time-series patterns in the real price of the three primary fuel
inputs for electricity — coal, oil, and natural gas. All three fuels had low prices around 1970, a
spike during the OPEC crisis in 1975, a decline in the mid-1980s as the crisis subsided, and lastly
an increase in the 2000s due in part to rapid economic growth in Asia. While the secular trends
are similar among all three fuels, each fuel has independent variation. Coal, for example, was the
most costly fuel in the 1970s but the cheapest in the 2000s. While the 1980s crisis produced abrupt
changes in oil and natural gas prices, it led to only gradual and smooth changes in coal prices. As
fuel prices vary nationally, differences in marginal electricity generation units fuel input shares cause
that national fuel price variation to differentially affect regional electricity prices and/or industries
dependent on those fuels.
We formalize the relationship between regional electricity prices and regional heterogeneity in
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fuel inputs used for electricity as follows. We interact (lagged) cross-sectional differences in the
share of fuels used to generate electricity in a state-year with national time-series variation in the
A:
prices of these fuels to generate three instruments summarized in the vector zst
A
zst
=

X

 A

A
e−s,t,f · σs,t−k,f

(8)

f ∈{coal, gas, oil}

The variable eA
−s,t,f represents the unweighted national mean over state-level log mean fuel prices
f in year t, excluding the state s mean. This research design considers three fuels: coal, oil, and
A
natural gas. The variable σs,t−k,f
represents the cost of fuel f in year t − k, expressed as a share of

total fuel expenditure of these three fuels for electricity generation in state s. We present results
using lags k of zero, two, and five years. We use the leave-out mean and lagged shares to ensure
that energy price variation is independent of local demand for fuels and electricity.37
The second source of variation in marginal costs stems from the fact that different industries
use different fuel inputs to produce outputs. Table 1 shows the allocation of energy expenditure
across fuels as a fraction of total input expenditures, by industry. Total input expenditures are
defined as annual expenditures on salary and wages, capital rental rates, materials, electricity, and
fuels. For example, 0.7% of total input costs for box manufacturing come from natural gas, but
13 percent of total input costs in cement come from coal. We formalize the predicted variation in
industrial energy prices by interacting national, leave-out mean energy input prices for industrial
consumers with the (lagged) share of energy input costs in an industry-year devoted to a particular
fuel.
B
zit
=

X


 B
B
e−s,t,f · σi,t−k,f

(9)

f ∈{coal, gas, oil, electricity}
B contains four instruments, one for each fuel. The variable σ B
Here, the vector zit
i,t−k,f represents

the share of total expenditures in industry i and year t − k devoted to fuel f . The variable eB
−s,t,f
denotes the national, leave-out mean input price of fuel f for industrial consumers.38 This research
design considers four energy inputs: coal, oil, natural gas, and electricity.
There are three main differences between the equations used in the two research designs (8)
and (9). First, the electricity price research design uses national energy input prices for electricity
generation eA
−s,t,f , whereas the energy price research design uses national energy input prices for
industrial consumers eB
−s,t,f . Second, the energy price research design includes electricity along
with the three primary fuels as energy inputs, while the electricity price research design only uses
the three primary fuels used for electricity generation. Lastly, energy input shares σ are calculated
37

While state-based leave-out mean shares may be susceptible to local demand due to regional spillover effects,
we include region-year fixed effects as a robustness exercise and note that these instruments improve on the existing
literature Aldy and Pizer (2015).
38
We calculate energy input expenditure shares at the industry level using the data from MECS and the ASM
fuel trailers. In principle, we could compute energy input expenditure shares by plant or industry×region. Small
sample sizes in both the MECS and the ASM preclude the use of more granular industry energy input expenditure
share definitions, such as eB
i,−s,t,f . Industry×region energy input expenditure share definitions deliver similar but less
precise results.
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differently in both equations; equation (8) calculates shares as the fraction of electricity generation
in a state that comes from fuel f , and equation (9) calculates energy expenditures as a fraction of
total expenditures for a given industry, fuel, and year.

5.4

Effects of Energy Prices on Unit Prices, Marginal Costs, and Markups

The goal of these “shift-share” research designs is to use the predicted sources of variation in
energy prices to analyze the pass-through of marginal costs to product prices. However, it is
also informative to understand how these measures of energy prices are related to unit prices and
marginal costs. In the context of instrumental variables, one can interpret the relationship between
unit prices and these fuel price×fuel share interactions as the reduced form, whereas the relationship
between marginal costs and the fuel price×fuel share interactions as the first stage. We also examine
the relationship between this energy price variation and plant level markups.
We investigate this question with the following fixed effects regression model:
0
0
yist = zist
β + Xst
γ + ηi + πt + νist

(10)

Equation (10) describes a regression of outcome y in logs (unit prices, marginal costs, or markups)
for plant i in state s and year t. The vector zist represents either the interaction between national
A (i.e., equation (8)) or the interaction
fuel prices and state-level electricity generation shares from zst
B (i.e., equation (9)).
between national energy prices and industry-level energy input shares from zit

In either case, we include each of the fuels as separate variables in the vector z. The vector Xst
includes the leave-out mean energy/fuel prices e−s,t,f separately for each fuel. It also includes the
A
either the generation share σs,t−k,f
, measured k years ago in state s, or the industry energy input
B
, measured k years ago in industry i. Some specifications also control separately for
share σi,t−k,f

differential trends by state, region by year fixed effects, and industry by year fixed effects. The
regression also includes plant fixed effects ηi and year fixed effects πt .
The interpretation of the coefficient vector of interest β differs across the two research designs.
A , the vector β describes the
When estimating equation (10) using the electricity price shift-share zst

elasticity of outcome Yist with respect to the national (leave-out mean) fuel price for fuel f for a
state that produces 100 percent of its electricity using fuel f . In practice, no state generates all of
its electricity from a single fuel source, so these coefficients should be evaluated at the mean value
of a fuel’s generation share. During our sample, this is about 20 percent for natural gas. When
B , the vector β describes the elasticity
estimating equation (10) using the energy price shift-share zit

of outcome Yist with respect to the national (leave-out mean) fuel price for fuel f in an industry
for which 100 percent of the industry’s total annual expenditures are devoted to energy input f ,
where f is electricity, fuel oil, natural gas, or coal. Again, no industry uses a single fuel input for
production, and so these coefficients should be evaluated at the mean value of respective energy
expenditure share (see Table 1).
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5.5

Pass-Through

We use our data on unit prices, recovered estimates of marginal costs, and constructed energy price
variation to estimate marginal cost pass-through. We estimate the marginal cost pass-through
elasticity from the following plant-level regression of (log) output price on (log) marginal costs:
0
pist = ρM C, mcit + Xst
γ + ηi + πt + ist

(11)

The main coefficient of interest, ρM C, , measures the elasticity of unit prices with respect to marginal
costs. Note that ρM C, differs from the marginal cost pass-through rate ρM C outlined earlier in
that ρM C, represents an elasticity whereas ρM C is pass-through in levels. The marginal cost
pass-through rate can be calculated by multiplying the pass-through elasticity by the markup:
ρM C = ρM C, × P/M C.
Equation (11) includes the same vector of controls Xst as above, along with plant fixed effects
ηi , year fixed effects πt , and an idiosyncratic error ist .39 As above, we report additional regression
estimates that control separately for differential trends by state, region by year fixed effects, and
A or z B . As mentioned
industry by year fixed effects. We instrument for mcit using either zst
it

above, equation (10) describes both the first stage and reduced form from an instrumental variables
regression of price on marginal cost in equation (11).

5.6

Demand Estimation

Finally, in order to consider incidence in markets that are less than perfectly competitive, we need
to estimate industry-specific demand elasticities. We estimate demand for each industry using
methods proposed by FHS. They estimate log-linear demand by regressing log quantity on log
price, instrumenting price with a measure of physical total factor productivity, and controlling for
year fixed effects and the log of county income. As FHS discuss, physical productivity measures
producers’ idiosyncratic technologies (physical production costs), and it strongly predicts prices.
Further, it is unlikely it will be correlated with short-run, plant-specific demand shocks embodied
in the error term of an OLS regression of log quantity on log price. We use the same physical
productivity index used in FHS. We create this index by subtracting log inputs from log outputs,
using industry-level cost shares as proxies for output elasticities. We use capital, materials, labor,
and energy inputs, where capital, materials, and energy are deflated by industry-year input price
deflators, and labor is measured in production hours. The industry specific input price deflators
come from the NBER-CES Productivity database. County income measures come from the BEA
Local Area Employment Statistics.
39
In both research designs, the excluded instrument is the interaction of the leave-out mean fuel price with the
share of that fuel used for energy. We also control for both of these variables in levels as exogenous controls X. The
most informative way to interpret the interaction terms is to evaluate them at some share (e.g., what is the effect of
gas price increases in an area that uses gas for 100% of energy). Because these energy prices are approximately the
national value (subject to leaving out the own-state price), the energy price controls in this regression are similar to
flexible year trends.
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This methodology estimates the demand elasticity described in the incidence theory section.
The formulas in that section depend on the effect of a change in an individual firm’s price on that
firm’s quantity, though this elasticity is common across firms. Because this methodology uses the
physical productivity level for an individual plant and year, it corresponds well with the theory.
Importantly, this is a different elasticity from the change in demand if the entire market faced a
cost shock.

6

Results

Now that we have described the theory, data, and methodology, we turn to describe four sets of
results: mean levels of prices, markups, and marginal costs; the effects of energy input cost shocks
on these variables; marginal cost pass-through; and incidence.

6.1

Average Levels of Marginal Costs, Unit Prices, and Markups

Table 2 presents some key summary statistics by industry. Column (1) shows that total annual
expenditures on electricity and fuels comprise a limited fraction of input costs.40 The mean energy
cost share for most industries in our sample is 2 percent of total annual input expenditures, though
cement and gasoline refining are quite different from the others, with 32 and 84 percent of total
expenditures devoted to electricity and fuels.41 While energy is not a large cost share for several
of these industries, it is also a modest cost share of the entire U.S. economy, at 3 to 4 percent of
gross output. Firms and consumers are not concerned that energy is their largest single cost, but
that it is a cost affected substantially by regulation in ways that are politically sensitive.
Columns (2) through (4) show median estimates of output elasticities separately for labor,
materials, and capital. As described in the previous section, we estimate production functions, and
hence output elasticities, separately for each industry using a translog, gross-output production
function, so output elasticities vary by plant. A few properties of the estimated output elasticities
are worth noting. First, median output elasticities for all industries and factors of production are
positive. Second, elasticities vary considerably across industries. The estimated output elasticity
for labor, for example, is 0.04 for boxes but 0.91 for cement. For each of the three factors of
production, cement has the largest estimated output elasticity among all industries. Third, the
output elasticities differ considerably across factors of production. For all industries, materials has
the largest output elasticity, at between 0.6 and 1.1. Capital and labor output elasticities are much
smaller.
Column (5) of Table 2 presents the median of the sum of the three output elasticities, which
is a measure of returns to scale in the industry. The results suggest that, except for cement, all
40

Energy cost shares are defined as annual energy and electricity expenditures at a plant divided by salary and
wage payments, rental payments on capital stocks, and expenditures on materials, electricity, and fuels.
41
As mentioned earlier, the energy cost share for gasoline is high in large part because much of the crude oil used at
refineries is physically transformed into gasoline (i.e., it is “feedstock”) rather than being combusted at the refinery
for heat or fuel.
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the industries in our study cement have approximately constant returns to scale, with estimated
returns to scale of 0.92 to 1.13. Cement is quite obviously different from the others, with strongly
increasing returns to scale at 2.46. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) find constant returns
to scale for all of these industries except cement, which they do not analyze. Since cement uses
some of the largest industrial equipment in the world, it may not be surprising that we estimate
cement to have increasing returns to scale. Column (6) shows average markups of ten to fifty
percent across industries except for cement, which is quite different from the others, with markups
of 130 percent. The product with the lowest estimated markup is gasoline, with markups of only
11 percent. These levels of industry markups are largely consistent with the existing literature
that estimates markups using production function methods (Hall, 1986; De Loecker, Goldberg,
Khandelwal, and Pavcnik, Forthcoming; Collard-Wexler and De Loecker, 2015).42
Columns (7) and (8) present mean unit prices and marginal costs by industry. Unit prices
are constructed by dividing revenue by output quantities, and marginal costs are constructed by
subtracting the log markup from the log output price. Lastly, column (9) presents the share of
materials expenditures as a fraction of total revenue, which is used to construct markups in column
(6).

6.2

Effects of Energy Prices on Marginal Costs, Unit Prices, and Markups

Table 3 presents our baseline set of results describing how variation in fuel input costs for electricity
generation differentially affects markups, marginal costs, and unit prices for U.S. manufacturing
plants. Table 4 presents similar estimates using industry heterogeneity in energy input cost shares.
These two tables reflect the two research designs in equations (8) and (9), and they stem from
various versions of equation (10) which are estimated using OLS. Standard errors in this table
and all subsequent regression output are clustered by state, unless otherwise mentioned. Because
the first research design focuses on cross-region differences in electricity prices, it has stronger
external validity to sub-national greenhouse gas mitigation policies like the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative, a cap-and-trade for electricity in the Northeast. By contrast, the second research
design has national scope. Ultimately, the two distinct research designs lead to similar pass-through
and incidence estimates.
Panel A of Table 3 analyzes how variation in fuel prices affects plant-level marginal costs.
We report coefficients on the interactions between fuel prices and (lagged) state-level electricity
generation shares. The regression models also control separately for the levels of fuel prices and for
generation shares. Since both the dependent variable and the fuel variables are measured in logs,
the reported interaction terms represent an elasticity for states in which 100 percent of generation
42

De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (Forthcoming) find industry median markups in Indian manufacturing ranging from 1.15 to 2.27. Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2015) explore markups in the U.S. steel industry
ranging from 1.2 to 1.5 depending on the time period studied. Hall (1986) explores markups using more aggregated
industry definitions (2-digit SIC) but finds results that are largely consistent with our own. For example, Hall (1986)
finds an estimated markup for SIC 34, which consists of both Cement and Ready Mix Concrete, of 1.81. Similarly,
Plywood manufacturing, SIC 24, has an estimated markup above marginal cost of 1.0.
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comes from a given fuel. Each column in the table shows a slightly different specification. Columns
(1) and (4) use the contemporaneous state-level generation mix for each fuel; columns (2) and (5)
use two year lags, and columns (3) and (6) use five-year lags of the generation shares. Columns
(1) through (3) control for plant fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state trends, whereas columns
(4) through (6) control for product-year fixed effects, region-year fixed effects, and state trends.
The identifying variation across all columns comes from within-plant variation in fuel shares and
prices, while adjusting for various forms of time-varying observed and unobserved determinants of
marginal costs that may be correlated with changes in predicted regional fuel prices.
These regressions give expected signs and plausible magnitudes. The coefficients in Panel A
of Table 3 are mostly positive, which is expected since shocks to fuel input prices are likely to
increase electricity prices that firms face and hence increase their marginal costs of production.
The smaller coefficients in columns (4)-(6), those with region-year and product-year fixed effects,
seem to suggest that there may be other correlated unobservables driving costs and prices in the
absence of these controls. Note, however, that the ratio of the coefficients in Panels A and B remain
largely similar across columns. The magnitudes of these coefficients are also reasonable. Recall
that energy is on average 2 percent of production costs for most of these industries, and electricity
expenditures represent an even smaller share. Column (6), which includes a 5-year lag in generation
shares, implies that if natural gas provides 100 percent of in-state electricity generation, then a 1
percent increase in the price of natural gas used for electricity results in a 0.29 percent increase
in the marginal costs of manufacturing production. In practice, natural gas constitutes about
20 percent of electricity generation over this time period.43 Thus, these estimates imply that a 1
percent increase in natural gas prices would cause an 0.06 percent increase in marginal costs.44 The
magnitude of this coefficient varies across fuels. Since this research design only exploits variation
in electricity markets, it is not surprising that the gas coefficient is more precise than the oil or
coal coefficients since oil is used for very little electricity generation, and coal has more regional
markets (so the leave-out mean is less predictive).45 The response of power plants and regulators
to energy price shocks through fuel substitution, efficiency improvements, or strategic production
decisions, however, may also vary across fuels.
Panel B of Table 3 presents a version of equation (10) which uses log unit prices as the dependent
variable. The signs and precision are similar to the marginal cost estimates of Panel A. The positive
and precise estimates in Panel B provide a first piece of evidence that energy price shocks are passed
through to plant-level unit prices. The fact that the effects of energy price shocks on unit prices (in
Panel B) are smaller than the estimated effects on marginal costs (in Panel A), however, suggests
43

20 percent natural gas generation corresponds to the fraction of production that is generated by coal, natural
gas, and oil (i.e., excluding other methods of generation such as nuclear or hydroelectric).
44
Note that the results in Table 3 do not control for and/or model industry specific variation in fuel input usage.
Thus, to the extent that national fuel prices affect the marginal cost of production through channels other than
electricity prices (e.g., through increased fuel costs used directly for production), these estimates implicitly incorporate
this variation. The second research design used in Table 4 does account for raw coal, oil, and gas used as direct inputs
to manufacturing.
45
According to the State Energy Database System, oil accounted for about 15 percent of BTUs used in the electric
power sector in the 1970s, 5 percent in the 1980s and 3 percent in the 1990s
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that these cost shocks are less than fully passed through to prices.
Finally, Panel C of Table 3 presents a version of equation (10) which uses log markups as the
dependent variable. Since markups are defined as the ratio of prices to marginal costs, the effects
of changes in energy prices on markups approximately equal the difference between their effects
on marginal costs and unit prices. Thus, the numbers in Panel C can largely be inferred from the
numbers in Panels A and B. The point estimates suggest that increasing the price of fuels used
for electricity causes modest decreases in markups. The more stringent specifications of columns
(4)-(6) imply that increasing the natural gas price by 1 percent for in-state electricity generation
decreases markups by around 0.01 percent.46
Table 4 presents a similar set of results, exploring how markups, marginal costs, and unit prices
differentially respond to changes in energy input costs used for production. As before, we report
the coefficients from the interaction between energy input shares, which is defined as the share of
total input costs devoted to a specific energy input, with national energy prices, which are defined
as the leave out mean national industrial energy price, omitting the focal state’s average industrial
energy price. We focus on the four primary energy inputs into manufacturing production: coal,
natural gas, oil, and electricity. Since we use information from MECS and the ASM fuel trailers
to construct energy input shares, and the ASM trailers only begin in 1975, we are not able to lag
these shares more than 2 years without losing an extra year in our analysis sample.
Panel A of Table 4 suggests that increases in the costs of energy used for manufacturing increase
marginal costs. The interaction term represents the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to
energy input prices in a plant for which 100 percent of total expenditures comes from one of the
four energy sources. Thus, if we were able to perfectly measure fuel prices faced by a plant, we
might expect that the coefficient should be close to 100. In practice, there are many reasons that
the coefficients may deviate from 100, not the least of which is that fuel expenditure shares in the
neighborhood of 100 percent are far out of sample. Moreover, we observe average industrial fuel
prices which might be quite different than marginal fuel prices faced by the firms in our sample. The
broad takeaway is that relative fuel input usage interacted with national fuel prices strongly predicts
changes in marginal costs, unit prices, and markups. Subsequent sections use these relationships
to quantify by how much fuel and electricity price induced increases in marginal costs are passed
through to consumers in the form of higher unit prices.

6.3

Marginal Cost Pass-Through

We now take the estimated relationships between prices, marginal costs, markups, and energy prices
and embed them into a pass-through regression of unit prices regressed on marginal costs. Table 5
presents OLS regression estimates corresponding to various versions of equation (11). Column (1)
presents estimates with plant fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state trends. Columns (2) and
(3) add product-year and region-year fixed effects, respectively. Column (4) includes the full set of
46

This comes from calculating the means across columns (4) through (6), weighting by the inverse standard error,
and then multiplying by the average generation share of natural gas in our sample of 0.2.
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product-year and region-year controls to the model from Column (1). Since both the dependent
and independent variables are in logs, the coefficient estimates measure an elasticity. The estimates
across the four columns are broadly similar, suggesting that a 1 percent increase in marginal costs
is associated with a 0.6 percent increase in the unit price. In order to convert this pass-through
elasticity into a pass-through rate, we multiply the coefficient by the average markup in the sample
of 1.15, which gives a marginal cost pass-through rate of 0.7.
To address the possible endogeneity of marginal costs, Table 6 presents instrumental variable
estimates of equation (11), where marginal costs are instrumented in two separate ways. Panel
A presents pass-through estimates where marginal costs are instrumented using the interactions
between the lagged electricity generation mix in a state and the log of the leave out mean electricity
fuel input prices. Panel B instruments marginal costs with the interaction between an industry’s
share of annual expenditures devoted to one of four energy inputs multiplied by the national, leaveout mean of that energy input price. As before, columns (1) through (3) include plant fixed effects,
year fixed effects, and state-specific trends. These columns vary the lag in the fuel share component
of the marginal cost instrument between zero, two, and five years. Columns (4) through (6) of Panel
A add region-year fixed effects and product-year fixed effects, whereas Columns (4) through (6) of
Panel B add only region-year fixed effects.47 We present estimates showing zero, two, and five lags
of the fuel share. All columns include the uninteracted log of the fuel prices and the uninteracted,
lagged generation mix (not reported).
Panel A suggests that pass-through elasticities range between 0.62 and 0.72, which translates
into pass-through rates of 0.71 to 0.83. The strength of the identifying variation in the instrument
varies slightly across the specifications, with first stage partial F statistics ranging from 4 to 14.
These first stage F-statistics suggest there may be bias stemming from a weak first stage, where
the bias is towards the OLS counterpart. The results in Panel B are broadly consistent with those
in Panel A, though they are estimated using a different instrument for marginal costs. The energy
price instrument in Panel B is also a stronger predictor of marginal costs than the electricity price
instrument in Panel A, as reflected by the first stage F-statistics of between 66 and 137. The
average pass-through elasticity in Panel B is around 0.51, which translates into a pass-through rate
of 0.59.
This overall pass-through elasticity may hide important cross-industry heterogeneity. Table 7
reports estimates of pass-through rates separately for each of the six industries in our sample.
Panel A presents specifications that instrument marginal costs with our electricity price instrument,
controlling for year fixed effects and state specific linear time trends. Panel B presents estimates
that also include region-year fixed effects. All regressions control for plant fixed effects. Note that
year fixed effects in an industry-level regression correspond to industry-year fixed effects from a
pooled cross-industry regression. These tables reveal substantial cross-industry heterogeneity in
the pass-through of marginal costs into unit prices. Pass-through elasticities vary from a high of
0.96 for boxes to a low of 0.33 for gasoline refining.48 Table 7 also reports the corresponding pass47
48

Industry expenditure shares for fuel inputs are collinear with product-year fixed effects in Panel B.
In both research designs, the first-stage F-statistics for gasoline and bread are not large, so we interpret pass-
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through rates, which are calculated by multiplying the elasticity estimate by the industry-specific
markup. These estimates suggest that boxes, cement, and plywood “overshift” changes in marginal
costs into changes in unit prices. The pass-through rates for these industries vary between 1.02 and
1.78. Conversely, bread, concrete, and gasoline refining have comparatively low pass-through rates
ranging from 0.36 to 0.82.
Appendix Table A1 presents industry-specific pass-through estimates. Marginal costs here are
instrumented using the interaction between an industry’s share of annual expenditures devoted
to one of four energy inputs and the national, leave-out mean of that energy input price. The
results remain quite similar to those in Table 7. One challenge with estimating industry-specific
pass-through rates using industry-year level instruments is the inability to control for other timevarying shocks that may affect both marginal costs and output prices in a given year (i.e., we cannot
include year fixed effects). Since our energy prices are calculated as leave out mean of the national
energy price (excluding the focal state), the model is still identified when one includes year fixed
effects. However, the identifying variation in a model with year fixed effects stems from idiosyncratic
differences in state-level fuel prices driven by the “leave-out variation that may be more subject to
endogeneity concerns. With these limitations in mind, Appendix Table A1 presents estimates that
are qualitatively similar to industry-specific estimates using the electricity price instrument.
How reasonable are these numbers? Some industries exhibit pass-through rates that exceed one,
suggesting that producer surplus may actually increase due to a change in tax. Various researchers
have shown the conditions under which overshifting can occur under oligopoly (see e.g., Bulow
and Pfleiderer (1983); Seade (1985); Delipalla and Keen (1992)). The general intuition from this
literature suggests that in the presence of oligopoly, a single firm can raise industry prices by
reducing its own output, but it fails to do so because it is costly for the single firm in terms of
foregone profits. A tax-induced cost increase will necessarily induce output-reductions for all firms,
imposing upon the producers some of the collusion they themselves had been unable to achieve.49
Studies have found pass-through rates ranging from below unity (Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2008;
Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh, and Li, 2011; Campa and Goldberg, 2005), to above unity (Besley
and Rosen, 1999), to equal to unity (Poterba, 1996; Fabra and Reguant, 2014), depending on the
methodology, market, time-period, or data used. Empirically, we observe higher pass-through rates
in industries where we see relatively inelastic demand and higher markups. Conversely, we observe
lower pass-through rates in industries with elastic demand and lower markups. As emphasized
by Seade (1985) and more recently by Weyl and Fabinger (2013), pass-through in imperfectly
competitive product markets is closely related to the curvature of demand — very convex demand
will typically have pass-through rates exceeding one, whereas concave demand will have passthrough estimates for these two industries cautiously given that they suffer from weak instruments.
49
Seade (1985) describes this as a “public-goods problem” – restraint by any one firm in the industry in question
raises the prices they all face for their outputs, constituting a common benefit. But the cost of this restraint, in
the form of profitable revenue foregone, is borne by that one firm alone. Hence, too little of that good is produced
(i.e., there is too little restraint). A cost increase will necessarily reduce output, thus raising the supply of the public
good “restraint.” In other words, in the absence of explicit collusion, the tax acts as a coordinating device allowing
oligopolists to restrict output and thereby increase profit.

27

through rates below one.
Whether firms actually benefit from the increase in input costs is an empirical question that
turns on whether the pass-through of the tax increases revenues enough to overcome both the lower
demand due to higher prices as well as the direct cost increase due to the tax. We now turn to this
question by computing incidence for each of the six industries in our study.

6.4

Incidence

Table 8 describes the incidence of an energy input tax separately for each of the six industries.
Panel A presents the necessary components for calculating incidence using equation (2). We require
estimates of pass-through rates, demand elasticities, and the Lerner index, by industry. We use
the average industry pass-through rate from Table 7.50 This panel also presents our estimates
of demand elasticities and combines results from previous tables to construct the Lerner index.
Cement has fairly inelastic demand with an elasticity of 1.82, which fits with its high estimated
markup. Gasoline refining has relatively elastic demand of 8.70 percent, which fits with its low
markups.51 Appendix Table A2 presents a table of our demand elasticity estimates that contains
both OLS and instrumental variable estimates.
Panel B presents incidence estimates. To simplify exposition, we report the change in consumer
surplus as a share of the total change in surplus between producers and consumers, or I/(I +
1) =

(dCS/dτ )
dCS/dτ +dP S/dτ .

The results suggest, that even in industries with pass-through rates below 1,

consumers bear a majority of the burden of a change in input costs. Gasoline refining is a notable
exception, with producers bearing 76 percent of the burden of an energy price induced increase in
marginal costs. In general, for industries with lower pass-through rates, consumers bear a smaller
share of the burden of the increase in input costs – 53 percent in the bread industry, 49 percent in
concrete, and about a 25 percent of the burden in gasoline refining. In all industries, consumers
bear substantially less than 100 percent of the burden.
6.4.1

Incidence Bounding

Rows 5 and 6 of Table 8 present our estimates of incidence under the assumption that firms engage
in monopoly or perfect competition, respectively. Incidence under monopoly assumes the Lerner
index is the inverse of the demand elasticity, and incidence under perfect competition assumes that
the Lerner index equals zero, since perfectly competitive firms do not charge markups. Therefore,
computing incidence for the polar cases of perfect competition or monopoly only require estimates
of marginal cost pass-through and does not require either demand elasticities or firm markups.
50
We average the two pass-through estimates for each industry weighting by the inverse of the standard error of
each estimate.
51
Many studies use time-series data estimate the “demand elasticity for gasoline” as the change in national consumer
gasoline consumption due to a national change in retail gasoline sales. As discussed earlier, our paper analyzes a
different demand elasticity, which represents the change in wholesale gasoline sales from a single refinery due to a
price increase at that single refinery. Because gasoline is homogenous and easily substitutable between refineries, it
is perhaps not surprising that we estimate a somewhat large demand elasticity.
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Moreover, if products in an industry are substitutes and there is no collusion, these polar cases will
bound the “true” incidence in the presence of market power. We also note that the pass-through
rate itself may depend on the market structure. The conceptual exercise here is that we have
estimated the pass-through rate given the existing (unknown) market structure. Conditional on
the estimated pass-through rate, the bounding exercise calculates the possible values of incidence
that could be consistent with the estimated pass-through rate.
The results in panel D under monopoly are somewhat similar to those under oligopoly. In
general, under the assumption of monopoly, incidence shifts more towards producers relative to
consumers. The greatest difference occurs in the plywood industry, where consumers go from
facing 67-87% of the burden to only 52% of the burden.
Panel E presents incidence of input costs under the assumption of perfect competition. The
incidence of the increase in input costs under perfect competition are identical to the pass-through
rates. When pass-through rates are greater than .50, consumers face more than 50% of the burden.
In the box, cement, and plywood industries, consumers face more than 100% of the burden as
producers pass through over 100% of marginal cost increases onto the consumer.

7

Conclusion

In this paper we develop a methodology for estimating the partial equilibrium incidence of input cost
shocks that is able to relax assumptions pertaining to complete pass-through, factor substitution,
and industry competitiveness. The approach leverages the fact that equilibrium prices, and the
extent to which they respond to cost shocks, are sufficient statistics for more primitive demand
and supply parameters describing a market. With further information on markups and demand
elasticities, we are able to extend this intuition to general forms of imperfect competition.
We consider the specific application of energy cost shocks for U.S. manufacturing, and we assess
the extent to which the welfare consequences of these shocks are borne by manufacturing producers
versus consumers. Standard analyses of the incidence of various types of energy cost shocks, such
as climate change mitigation regulations, typically assume perfect competition and complete passthrough. Our results suggest that the incidence of a change in input costs, defined as the ratio of
the change in consumer to producer surplus, differs dramatically from these assumptions. In one
industry consumers bear almost 90 percent of the total change in input costs. This result stems
from the ability of producers to more than fully pass through the change in input prices into unit
output prices. In other industries, especially those with elastic demand, producers bear a greater
incidence of the change in input costs.
This paper also arrives at a few additional conclusions that may be of broader interest. First, the
standard assumptions of complete pass-through and perfect competition in research on the incidence
of commodity price shocks may be overly strong; these assumptions appear to be incorrect for all
the industries we study. This existing research has led to politically sensitive conclusions on the
extent to which greenhouse gas mitigation policies are regressive, and it would be productive to
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revisit those conclusions while accounting for industry competiveness and incomplete pass-through.
For example, firm owners may shoulder more of the burden than existing research would suggest.
On the other hand, some industries may actually benefit from increasing energy prices through
a carbon tax. For example, in industries that “overshift” input taxes, the firm-level gains from
reducing output in an economy with market power may exceed the direct detrimental effect of the
tax for the firm. While we do not observe energy price-induced increases in producer surplus in
this setting, more work is needed to understand how these results generalize into other industries
and time periods. The second more general takeaway is the considerable heterogeneity across
industries; the one industry which has been the subject of scrutiny in research on market power
and the environment – cement – seems to differ from the five other industries we study in much of
the analysis.
One productive avenue for future work is to overcome the existing limitations associated with the
paucity of producer price data linked to information on firm input and output decisions in the United
States, which might facilitate estimating firm-specific pass-through rates. Another is to incorporate
our conclusions about incomplete pass-through and industry competitiveness into an economy-wide,
general equilibrium framework that can both account for pre-existing distortions in other markets
while analyzing incidence by different consumer demographics. Lastly, the technology developed
here is well-suited to think about incidence of other changes in input costs across industries, for
example, stemming from changes in minimum wage laws or increased capital costs. We leave these
avenues for future work.
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Figures
Figure 1: Pass-Through and Incidence under Perfect Competition
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Notes: See text for full description. The top panel shows consumer and producer surplus (denoted CS and PS,
respectively) under general supply and demand curves in a market exhibiting perfect competition. The bottom panel
shows consumer and producer surplus following a tax rate τ that changes average variables costs by ∆avc, prices by
ρ, and quantity sold by ∆Q.
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Figure 2: Pass-Through and Incidence under Monopoly
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Notes: See text for full description. The top panel shows consumer surplus, producer surplus, and the deadweight
loss (denoted CS, PS, and DWL respectively) in a market with a single monopolist. The MR line denotes marginal
revenue and the MC line reflects an increasing marginal cost production function. The bottom panel shows consumer
and producer surplus, as well as deadweight loss following a tax t that changes average variables costs by ∆avc, prices
by ρ and quantity sold by ∆Q.
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Figure 3: Electricity Fuel Mix by Region
(b) Natural Gas

(a) Coal
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(c) Petroleum

Notes: These maps show the spatial distribution of electricity generation by fuel type by state averaged over our sample period, 1972-1997. Panel A shows the
fraction of electricity generation in a state that comes from coal-fired generation; Panel B shows the fraction of electricity generation in a state that comes from
natural gas; Panel C shows the fraction of electricity generation in a state that comes from petroleum.
Source: Energy Information Association, State Energy Data System.
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Figure 4: National Fuel Prices, 1967-2012
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Notes: This figure plots a time series of national fuel prices from 1967 to 2012. Prices have been converted to real
2011 dollars using the consumer price index. Crude oil prices reflect the price of U.S. crude oil net imports in dollars
per barrel. Natural gas prices reflect wellhead prices in dollars per thousand cubic feet. Coal prices reflect dollars
per short ton. Prices for coal and crude oil have been divided by 10 to facilitate a common axis across the 3 fuels.
Source: Energy Information Association, Annual Energy Review.
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Tables
Table 1: Allocation of Energy Input Expenditures Across Fuels, by Industry

Boxes
Bread
Cement
Concrete
Gasoline
Plywood

Coal

Natural Gas

Fuel Oil

Electricity

0.000
0.000
0.130
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.007
0.007
0.049
0.002
0.014
0.005

0.002
0.002
0.010
0.011
0.817
0.002

0.009
0.011
0.134
0.007
0.007
0.012

Notes: This table shows the average energy input percentage by industry for each of the four primary energy inputs
into manufacturing production. These statistics are calculated by dividing the expenditure on each of the four energy
inputs by the total annual expenditures (salary and wages; capital rental rates; materials; electricity; fuels) in the
industry. Expenditures on energy inputs for gasoline refining include energy feedstocks. Source: Manufacturing
Energy Consumption Survey, Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics

Output Elasticities
Energy
Cost Share
(1)

Labor
(2)

Materials
(3)

Capital
(4)

Returns
to Scale
(5)

Markup
(6)

Output
Price
(7)

Marginal
Costs
(8)

Materials Share
of Revenue
(9)

Observations
(10)

Boxes
Bread
Cement
Concrete
Gasoline
Plywood

0.02
0.02
0.32
0.02
0.84
0.02

0.04
0.28
0.91
0.11
0.01
0.02

0.95
0.63
1.08
0.68
0.99
0.95

0.04
0.09
0.19
0.16
0.03
0.11

1.00
1.13
2.46
1.09
1.02
0.92

1.47
1.20
2.30
1.12
1.11
1.48

0.63
0.47
0.05
43.82
23.08
0.68

0.43
0.39
0.02
39.82
20.84
0.57

0.65
0.53
0.46
0.61
0.89
0.62

1414
248
229
3369
284
139

Sample Mean

0.02

0.10

0.70

0.14

1.09

1.15

—

—

0.62

5683
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Notes: This table shows mean values of energy cost shares, output elasticities, and markups. An observation is a plant-year. Energy cost shares are the sum of
fuel and electricity expenditures divided by total annual expenditures (salary and wages; capital rental rates; materials; electricity; fuels). Plant-level markups
come from estimating production functions by industry using GMM-Proxy methods (Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer, 2015). Output elasticity estimates come from
a three factor, gross-output, translog production function, where the inputs consist of labor, capital, and materials. Price and costs are measured in 1000s of 1987
dollars. Boxes are measured in short tons; bread is measured in thousands of pounds; cement is measured in cubic yards; concrete is measured in thousands of
cubic yards; gasoline is measured in thousands of barrels; plywood is measured in thousands of square feet surface measure. See text for details. Source: Census
of Manufacturers.

Table 3: Relationship Between Marginal Costs, Unit Prices, Markups and Electricity Input Prices

(1)
Lag (t-0)

(2)
Lag (t-2)

(3)
Lag (t-5)

(4)
Lag (t-0)

(5)
Lag (t-2)

(6)
Lag (t-5)

0.374
(0.293)
0.225∗∗∗
(0.084)
0.047
(0.118)

0.123
(0.255)
0.291∗∗∗
(0.061)
-0.029
(0.139)

0.159
(0.257)
0.204∗∗∗
(0.061)
0.057
(0.094)

0.065
(0.223)
0.222∗∗∗
(0.054)
0.079
(0.108)

Panel A: Marginal Costs
Coal Price × Coal Share
Gas Price × Gas Share
Oil Price × Oil Share

0.092
(0.387)
0.779∗∗∗
(0.175)
0.136
(0.341)

0.156
(0.363)
0.788∗∗∗
(0.140)
0.229
(0.290)

-0.110
(0.311)
0.866∗∗∗
(0.191)
0.013
(0.201)

0.357
(0.244)
0.235∗∗∗
(0.086)
-0.070
(0.121)

Panel B: Unit Prices
Coal Price × Coal Share
Gas Price × Gas Share
Oil Price × Oil Share

0.081
(0.259)
0.491∗∗∗
(0.109)
0.101
(0.181)

0.063
(0.254)
0.502∗∗∗
(0.088)
0.172
(0.168)

-0.061
(0.197)
0.532∗∗∗
(0.101)
0.078
(0.131)

0.259
(0.263)
0.186∗∗
(0.074)
-0.008
(0.102)

Panel C: Markups
Coal Price × Coal Share
Gas Price × Gas Share
Oil Price × Oil Share
N
Plant FE
Year FE
State Trends
Product-Year FE
Region-Year FE

-0.012
(0.220)
-0.288∗∗∗
(0.080)
-0.035
(0.181)

-0.092
(0.183)
-0.286∗∗∗
(0.066)
-0.056
(0.134)

0.049
(0.171)
-0.334∗∗∗
(0.096)
0.065
(0.097)

-0.098
(0.156)
-0.049
(0.045)
0.062
(0.090)

-0.215
(0.172)
-0.021
(0.053)
0.010
(0.069)

-0.058
(0.172)
-0.069∗
(0.038)
0.107
(0.077)

5892

5892

5892

5892

5892

5892

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients from 18 separate regressions, 6 per panel and 1 per column. An
observation is a plant-year. Panel A presents a set of regressions, regressing plant-level marginal costs on national
fuel prices interacted with lagged shares of state-level electricity generation mix. Panels B and C present a similar
set of regressions, using plant-level unit prices and plant-level markups as the dependent variable, respectively. The
regression includes the uninteracted fuel prices and generation shares as controls (not reported). Columns (1) and
(4) report results using contemporaneous electricity generation shares, columns (2) and (5) present results lagging
generation shares by 2 years, and columns (3) and (6) present results lagging generation shares by 5 years. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by Census sampling weights. ***,**,*
denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. See text for details. Source: Census of
Manufacturers, EIA-SEDS.
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Table 4: Relationship Between Marginal Costs, Unit Prices, Markups and Energy Prices

(1)
Lag (t-0)

(2)
Lag (t-2)

(3)
Lag (t-0)

(4)
Lag (t-2)

Panel A: Marginal Costs
Coal Price × Coal Share
Gas Price × Gas Share
Oil Price × Oil Share
Electricity Price × Electricity Share

∗∗∗

38.54
(7.91)
139.60∗∗∗
(29.29)
358.58∗∗∗
(23.31)
-69.48∗∗
(32.15)

67.60∗∗∗
(8.90)
100.65∗∗
(41.61)
427.31∗∗∗
(84.93)
118.43
(113.81)

38.69∗∗∗
(7.95)
136.44∗∗∗
(29.32)
354.57∗∗∗
(22.63)
-70.59∗∗
(32.25)

66.79∗∗∗
(8.97)
97.41∗∗
(40.44)
419.99∗∗∗
(83.01)
112.69
(116.56)

Panel B: Unit Prices
Coal Price × Coal Share
Gas Price × Gas Share
Oil Price × Oil Share
Electricity Price × Electricity Share

13.95∗∗∗
(4.70)
76.65∗∗∗
(22.60)
183.76∗∗∗
(20.47)
-12.66
(18.75)

31.68∗∗∗
(5.75)
54.92∗∗
(24.18)
251.67∗∗∗
(53.38)
81.70
(69.18)

13.84∗∗∗
(4.67)
75.80∗∗∗
(22.71)
181.91∗∗∗
(20.05)
-12.18
(19.10)

31.06∗∗∗
(5.76)
53.09∗∗
(23.65)
247.12∗∗∗
(52.57)
78.83
(68.15)

Panel C: Markups
Coal Price × Coal Share
Gas Price × Gas Share
Oil Price × Oil Share
Electricity Price × Electricity Share
N
Plant FE
Year FE
State Trends
Region-Year FE

∗∗∗

-24.59
(4.79)
-62.95∗∗
(25.89)
-174.82∗∗∗
(17.73)
56.88∗∗
(23.70)

-35.92∗∗∗
(5.34)
-45.73∗∗
(20.41)
-175.64∗∗∗
(33.45)
-36.72
(47.93)

-24.85∗∗∗
(4.83)
-60.64∗∗
(25.59)
-172.66∗∗∗
(17.15)
58.41∗∗
(23.64)

-35.73∗∗∗
(5.33)
-44.31∗∗
(19.87)
-172.87∗∗∗
(32.35)
-33.85
(46.82)

5683

5683

5683

5683

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients from 12 separate regressions, 4 per panel and 1 per column. An
observation is a plant-year. Panel A presents a set of regressions, regressing plant-level marginal costs on national
energy input prices interacted with lagged industry energy expenditure shares. Panels B and C present a similar
set of regressions, using plant-level unit prices and plant-level markups as the dependent variable, respectively. The
regression includes the uninteracted fuel prices and expenditure shares as controls (not reported). Columns (1) and
(3) report results using contemporaneous electricity generation shares, and columns (2) and (4) present results lagging
expenditure shares by 2 years. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted
by Census sampling weights. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
See text for details. Source: Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers, MECS, and EIA-SEDS.

42

Table 5: Pass-Through Rate of Marginal Costs into Unit Prices: OLS

Marginal Costs
N
Plant FE
State Trends
Year FE
Product-Year FE
Region-Year FE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.598∗∗∗
(0.018)

0.680∗∗∗
(0.033)

0.598∗∗∗
(0.018)

0.681∗∗∗
(0.032)

5892

5892

5892

5892

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients from 4 separate regressions, one per column. An observation is a
plant-year. The dependent variable is the plant-level unit-price, and the independent variable is plant-level marginal
cost. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by Census sampling
weights. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. See text for details.
Source: Census of Manufacturers, EIA-SEDS.
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Table 6: Pass-Through Rate of Marginal Costs into Unit Prices: Instrumental Variables

(1)
Lag (t-0)

(2)
Lag (t-2)

(3)
Lag (t-5)

(4)
Lag (t-0)

(5)
Lag (t-2)

(6)
Lag (t-5)

Panel A: Electricity Shift-Share Instrument
Marginal Costs
N
First Stage F-Statistic
Plant FE
Year FE
State Trends
Product-Year FE
Region-Year FE

0.628∗∗∗
(0.031)

0.623∗∗∗
(0.031)

0.625∗∗∗
(0.029)

0.660∗∗∗
(0.099)

0.654∗∗∗
(0.088)

0.715∗∗∗
(0.086)

5892
9.53

5892
14.33

5892
6.99

5892
8.89

5892
3.95

5892
12.09

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Panel B: Fuel Shift-Share Instrument
Marginal Costs
N
First Stage F-Statistic
Plant FE
Year FE
State Trends
Region-Year FE

0.511∗∗∗
(0.013)

0.514∗∗∗
(0.014)

—
—

0.505∗∗∗
(0.012)

0.508∗∗∗
(0.014)

—
—

5683
137.48

5683
78.68

—
—

5683
120.74

5683
66.18

—
—

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients from 10 separate regressions, 6 regressions in Panel A and 4 regressions in Panel B. An observation is a plant-year. The dependent variable is the plant-level unit-price, and the
independent variable is plant-level marginal cost. In Panel A, marginal cost is instrumented by the interactions
between national fuel prices for electricity generation and lagged electricity generation shares. In Panel B, marginal
cost is instrumented by the interactions between national fuel prices for industrial production and lagged industry
energy expenditure shares. Columns (1) and (4) report results using contemporaneous electricity generation shares,
columns (2) and (5) present results lagging generation shares by 2 years, and columns (3) and (6) present results
lagging generation shares by 5 years. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by state. Regressions
are weighted by Census sampling weights. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively. See text for details. Source: Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers, MECS, EIA-SEDS.
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Table 7: Pass-Through Rate of Marginal Costs into Unit Prices, by Product: Instrumental Variables

(1)
Boxes

(2)
Bread

(3)
Cement

(4)
Concrete

(5)
Gasoline

(6)
Plywood

Panel A: Baseline - Electricity Price Instrument
Marginal Costs
N
Pass-Through Rate
First Stage F-Statistic
Plant FE
Year FE
State-Trends FE

0.963∗∗∗
(0.038)

0.681∗∗∗
(0.150)

0.775∗∗∗
(0.087)

0.711∗∗∗
(0.082)

0.327∗∗
(0.143)

0.692∗∗∗
(0.082)

1414
1.42
23.41

308
0.82
1.67

293
1.78
49.29

3369
0.80
23.36

345
0.36
2.43

163
1.02
38.55

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Panel B: Region-Year FE - Electricity Price Instrument
Marginal Costs
N
Pass-Through Rate
First Stage F-Statistic
Plant FE
Region×Year FE
State-Trends FE

0.992∗∗∗
(0.057)

0.458∗∗∗
(0.172)

0.801∗∗∗
(0.100)

0.624∗∗∗
(0.066)

0.242∗∗
(0.111)

0.758∗∗∗
(0.068)

1414
1.46
2.04

308
0.55
3.39

293
1.84
22.90

3369
0.70
13.5

345
0.27
4.22

163
1.12
30.10

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients from 14 separate regressions; one per column in each of the two
panels. Each column represents a separate sample, where the sample is indicated in the column headings. An
observation is a plant-year. The dependent variable is the plant-level unit-price, and the independent variable is
plant-level marginal cost. Marginal cost is instrumented by the interactions between national fuel prices for electricity
generation and 5-year lagged electricity generation shares. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by
state. Regressions are weighted by Census sampling weights. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent levels, respectively. See text for details. Source: Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers, MECS,
EIA-SEDS.
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Table 8: Incidence: Change in Consumer Surplus as Share of Change in Total Surplus

(1)
Boxes

(2)
Bread

(3)
Cement

(4)
Concrete

(5)
Gasoline

(6)
Plywood

Panel A: Incidence Components
MC Pass-Through (ρM C )
Demand Elasticity (D )
Mean Lerner Index (L)

1.43
3.24
0.33

0.69
2.42
0.18

1.81
1.82
0.57

0.74
5.53
0.13

0.31
8.70
0.12

1.08
1.39
0.41

Panel B: Consumer Share of Burden (by Market Structure)
Oligopoly

0.57

0.53

0.63

0.49

0.24

0.67

Monopoly
Perfect Competition

0.59
1.43

0.41
0.69

0.64
1.81

0.43
0.74

0.24
0.31

0.52
1.08

Notes: This table presents results for welfare incidence by industry, where incidence is defined as the change in
consumer surplus as a share of the change in consumer and producer surplus. Columns (1) - (6) reflect separate
calculations for industries defined in the column heading. Panel A displays the necessary components for measuring
incidence using equation (2). Marginal cost pass-through (ρM C ) is calculated as the average of the industry specific
pass-through rates in Table 7. Panel B displays incidence under different market structures. The first two lines
display incidence under arbitrary forms of oligopoly that next both perfect competition and monopoly. The third
and fourth rows of Panel B display incidence under monopoly and perfect competition using equation (2) where
L = 1/D and L = 0 respectively. Source: Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers, MECS, EIA-SEDS.
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Table A1: Pass-Through Rate of Marginal Costs into Unit Prices, by Product: Instrumental Variables

Marginal Costs
N
First Stage F-Statistic
Year FE
Plant FE
State-Trends FE

(1)
Boxes

(2)
Bread

(3)
Cement

(4)
Concrete

(5)
Gasoline

(6)
Plywood

0.946∗∗∗
(0.031)

0.214
(0.443)

0.706∗∗∗
(0.067)

0.743∗∗∗
(0.098)

0.491∗∗∗
(0.139)

0.825∗∗∗
(0.076)

1414
12.60

248
4.25

229
18.50

3369
15.22

284
4.73

139
77.18

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Notes: This table presents regression coefficients from 7 separate regressions; one per column. Each column represents
a separate sample, where the sample is indicated in the column headings. An observation is a plant-year. The
dependent variable is the plant-level unit-price, and the independent variable is plant-level marginal cost. Marginal
cost is instrumented by the interactions between national fuel prices for industrial production and 2-year lagged
industry energy expenditure shares. All regressions include plant fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific
trends. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by state. Regressions are weighted by Census sampling
weights. ***,**,* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. See text for details.
Source: Census and Annual Survey of Manufacturers, MECS, EIA-SEDS.
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Table A2: Demand Elasticity Estimates

(1)
Boxes

(2)
Bread

(3)
Cement

(4)
Concrete

(5)
Gas

(6)
Plywood

-0.59
(0.76)

-1.27∗∗∗
(0.14)

Panel A: OLS
Demand Elasticity (D )

-2.24∗∗∗
(0.59)

-0.11∗∗∗
(0.12)

-0.78∗∗∗
(0.12)

-0.60∗∗∗
(0.08)

Panel B: Productivity IV Estimates
Demand Elasticity (D )

-3.24∗∗∗
(0.18)

-2.42∗∗∗
(0.41)

-1.82∗∗∗
(0.47)

-5.53∗∗∗
(0.55)

-8.70∗
(4.94)

-1.39∗∗∗
(0.15)

N
First Stage F-Statistic

1414
816.9

308
33.9

293
15.6

3369
174.0

345
8.4

163
1180.0

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Year FE
ln(County Per Capita Income)

Notes: This table presents 12 separate regressions, 6 per panel. An observation is a plant-year, where the dependent
variable in all regressions is log(quantity). The independent variable is log(output price). Panel A presents OLS
estimates, separately by industry. Panel B presents estimates where price is instrumented with plant total factor
productivity. Total factor productivity is constructed using a quantity-based productivity index. The index is constructed by subtracting log inputs from log outputs using industry-level cost shares as proxies for output elasticities.
We use capital, materials, labor, and energy inputs, where capital, materials, and energy are deflated by industry-year
input price deflators, and labor is measured in production hours. Source: Census of Manufacturers, BEA Local Area
Employment Indicators.
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